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by
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University of Florence, Italy
ABSTRACT: In this study we analyze the concept of efficiency in co-operative banks
(CBs) from the points of view of the mutuality and sustainability of business. According
to the extant literature, CBs are often less efficient than traditional banks, but the
reason for this apparently higher inefficiency is strictly correlated to their statutory
commitments.
The purpose of this paper is to verify, through an empirical survey of 33 Tuscan
‘Banche di Credito Cooperativo’ (BCC), if a particular type of Italian CB is less or more
competitive compared to non-co-operative ones by using and adapting two financial
indicators: the financial value added and the cost-income ratio. Our findings show that
by implementing appropriate corrections to the value-added indicator and to the cost-
income ratio, BCC appear efficient and mission-oriented, with a significantly reduced
performance gap in comparison to non-co-operative credit institutions.
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Eficiencia mutualista y social de los bancos cooperativos italianos:
un ana´lisis empı´rico
En este artı´culo los autores analizan el concepto de eficiencia en el seno de los bancos cooperativos,
desde el punto de vista del cara´cter mutualista y sostenible de la empresa. Segu´n la literatura
existente, los bancos cooperativos son a menudo menos eficientes que los bancos tradicionales,
pero la razo´n de esta aparente ineficiencia ma´s elevada esta´ estrictamente correlacionada con sus
obligaciones estatuarias.
El objetivo de este artı´culo es verificar, sobre la base de una encuesta a 33 bancos cooperativos
toscanos, si un tipo particular de cooperativa de cre´dito italiana es ma´s o menos competitiva en
relacio´n con los bancos tradicionales, utilizando y adaptando dos indicadores financieros: el valor
an˜adido financiero y el ratio coste-beneficio. Los resultados indican que aplicando las correcciones
apropiadas a los mencionados indicadores, los bancos cooperativos aparecen eficaces y orientados
hacia su misio´n, con una diferencia de resultados significativamente reducida comparados con las
instituciones de cre´dito no cooperativas.
∗ Although the paper is the result of a team effort, Luca Bagnoli can be considered the
author of sections 4 and 5 and Giacomo Manetti the author of sections 1, 2, 3 and 6. E-mail:
luca.bagnoli@unifi.it; giacomo.manetti@unifi.it
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Efficience mutuelle et sociale des banques coope´ratives italiennes:
une analyse empirique
Dans cet article, les auteurs analysent le concept d’efficience au sein des banques coope´ratives (BCs)
du point de vue du caracte`re mutualiste et durable de l’entreprise. Selon la litte´rature existante,
les BCs sont souvent moins efficientes que les banques traditionnelles mais la raison de cette
inefficience apparemment plus e´leve´e est strictement corre´le´e a` leurs obligations statutaires.
L’objectif de cet article est de ve´rifier, sur base d’une enqueˆte empirique aupre`s de 33 banques
coope´ratives toscanes, si un type particulier de banque coope´rative italienne est plus ou moins
compe´titif par rapport aux banques non coope´ratives en utilisant et adaptant deux indicateurs
financiers : la valeur ajoute´e financie`re et le ratio couˆt-revenu. Les re´sultats indiquent qu’en appli-
quant des corrections approprie´es a` l’indicateur valeur ajoute´e et au ratio couˆt-revenu, les banques
coope´ratives toscanes paraissent efficaces et axe´es sur leur mission, avec un e´cart de performance
significativement re´duit par rapport aux institutions de cre´dit non coope´ratives.
Mutuale und soziale Effizienz italienischer Genossenschaftsbanken: Eine
empirische Analyse
In dieser Studie wird das Effizienzkonzept von Genossenschaftsbanken (co-operative banks =
CBs) unter den Gesichtspunkten des Gegenseitigkeitsprinzips (mutuality) und der Nachhaltigkeit
ihrer Gescha¨ftsta¨tigkeit analysiert. Nach der vorliegenden Literatur sind CBs oft weniger effizient
als traditionelle Banken, doch wird der Grund fu¨r diese anscheinend gro¨ßere Ineffizienz stets in
Verbindung mit ihren satzungsma¨ßigen Verpflichtungen gesehen.
Der Zweck dieses Beitrags ist, durch eine empirische Untersuchung bei 33 toskanischen ,,Banche
di Credito Cooperativo“ (BCCs) unter Anwendung und U¨bernahme zweier finanzieller Indikatoren
– der finanziellen Wertscho¨pfung und des Cost Income Ratios – zu verifizieren, ob ein besonderer
Typ italienischer CBs im Vergleich zu nicht-genossenschaftlichen Instituten mehr oder weniger
wettbewerbsfa¨hig ist. Die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass BCCs bei Vornahme geeigneter Korrekturen
an dem Wertscho¨pfungsindikator als effizient und auftragsorientiert erscheinen, mit signifikant
reduzierten Leistungsunterschieden im Vergleich zu nicht-genossenschaftlichen Kreditinstituten.
1 Introduction
Since the second part of the 19th century, co-operative banks (CBs) have been im-
portant actors within the European banking system that are capable of resolving eco-
nomic and social inequalities in the face of market failure (Bongini et al. 2007). Deeply
rooted in the local communities, they are able to create strong relationships among
their members based on trust and reciprocity, significantly increasing banking access to
small and medium enterprises, farmers, and low income households (Giagnocavo et al.
2012).
The main element that characterizes co-operative banks is their mutual nature.
The International Co-operative Alliance (1995) defines a co-operative as ‘an autonomous
association of persons united voluntarily to meet their common economic, social, and
cultural needs and aspirations through a jointly-owned and democratically-controlled
enterprise.’ According to the ICA, the co-operatives are characterized by:
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- free association and withdrawal of members, resulting in a variable co-operative
capital base;
- non-transferability of membership, implying the absence of a market for member
shares;
- a democratic structure that usually gives each member one vote regardless of his
or her investment;
- restricted profit distribution that is not necessarily proportional to members’
shareholdings;
- ownership rights that are limited to the nominal co-operative capital represented
by member shares (and therefore do not extend to the reserves and the total
economic value of the co-operative);
- and the pursuit of specific member interests rather than profit maximization.
Several categories of co-operatives exist, depending on their purpose and the na-
ture of theirmembers (producer, consumer, or worker co-operatives), but CBs are usually
consumer co-operatives since their members are also customers. As a result, the primary
aim of CBs is to provide the best possible products and services that fit with the needs
of their member-customers in a long-term relationship of trust.
According to the European Association of Co-operative Banks, CBs perform a
strong role in EU economies and the banking sectors. In 2010, for instance, CBs were
a driving force for socially committed business at the local level, involving over 4,000
member banks, 65,000 branches, 750,000 employees, 50 million members, 176 million
customers, 2,852 billion euro of deposits, 3,102 billion euro of loans and 5,524 billion
euro of total assets (EACB 2010a). The average market share of the sector is about
20% (weighted average of deposits). In some countries – for example, Austria, Germany,
Finland, France, Italy and the Netherlands – the market share lies well above this
figure, ranging from 30% to 50% (EACB 2007).
The differences between CBs and other banks can be identified not only by their
better customer-monitoring capability, but also in their debt-recovery capacity. In fact,
due to their close relationship with the local market and the area in which their bor-
rowers work or live, they have more power in controlling debtors (Berger and Mester
1997).
CBs generally have a high level of capitalization, stable incomes from retail busi-
ness, and a diversified credit portfolio (Pestana Barros et al. 2010). CBs maintain a
customer-oriented business model – including their ownership and governance struc-
tures – that benefits the EU, its banking system, its small and medium enterprises,
its consumers, and its economy. In fact, CB member-customers are fully involved in
the decision-making process of the bank, since they control the co-operative and exert
checks and balances at each level of the business, allowing organizations to minimize
risk, identify creditworthiness, and promptly respond to customers’ needs.
Even though these small financial institutions present a homogeneous business
model, their performance is strongly influenced by the economic conditions of their local
markets and by the necessity of satisfying their member-customers. The efficiency mea-
surement of CBs has to account for the heterogeneity of social and mutual commitments
in favor of their members and the local community. Thus, from an economic point of
view, CBs are often thought to be less efficient than non-co-operative ones. The root
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cause of this apparently higher inefficiency is the CB’s statutory commitments, that is,
fostering responsible behaviour by implementing democratic principles of governance
and focusing on retail banking (Stefancic 2010a).
The purpose of this paper is to verify if a particular type of European CB, the
Italian ‘Banche di Credito Cooperativo’ (BCC) (Di Salvo and Lopez 2010), is less or more
competitive compared to non-co-operative ones, by using and adapting two main finan-
cial indicators: the financial value added and the cost-income ratio (CIR). We also aim to
estimate socio-economic effectiveness and efficiency of a sample of BCC by considering
the special relationships these banks have with the territory in which they operate. Cost
efficiency is a fundamental goal for CBs, since wise cost management may guarantee
the survival of the business and, consequently, the continuity of activities and services
provided to members and customers.
The Italian co-operative banking system was established towards the end of the
19th century, with the foundation of the first ‘Casse Rurali and Artigiane’ banks among
the rural population. They aimed to provide loans at advantageous conditions, basing
their policy on very close attention to individualswhile at the same time depending on the
self-financing capacity of their members. Ever since, each BCC (the new denomination
of ‘Cassa Rurali and Artigiane’ after a legislative reform in the 1990s) has maintained a
close and profound relationship with its reference territory, interweaving its own history
with that of the local community (Stefancic 2010b).
The Italian BCCs constitute a particularly interesting case for our research aims,
for two main reasons:
- according to the EACB and Battaglia et al. (2010), Italian CBs have around
110,000 employees, 14 million customers, 2 million members and one third of
the market share of Italian banking deposits, playing a fundamental role in the
Italian banking system. Furthermore, the Italian co-operative credit sector is the
third largest in Europe (11% of the European co-operative banking sector), after
France and Germany;
- Italy has a territory with different economic, social, and demographic conditions
and CBs are strictly rooted in their local communities.
Since the connection with the local community represents an influential factor in
evaluating BCC performance, we decided to analyze the particular regional context of
Tuscany, where this kind of relationship is historically and culturally consolidated.
In Tuscany BCC were created among rural communities to grant more favourable
loans to local farmers and artisans, focusing on people and relying on their members’
self-financing capability (Silipo 2009). Since then, each BCC has kept strong and deep
ties with its territory, interweaving its history with that of the local community.
In the following sections we:
- analyze the existing literature that estimate efficiency in CBs and examine the
role of reporting and performance indicators in evaluating overall performance
by management;
- describe the sample used for our own empirical analysis and the process of effi-
ciency definition through the choice of opportune indicators;
© 2013 The Authors
Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics © 2013 CIRIEC
MUTUAL AND SOCIAL EFFICIENCY OF ITALIAN CO-OPERATIVE BANKS 293
- discuss the results obtained, present our conclusions, and outline the limitations
of the present study and possible further research.
2 Literature review
The literature shows that the selection of performance indicators affects perfor-
mance results and the evaluation of an organization’s performance (McNamara and
Mong 2005; Tange 2003). This assertion can be interpreted in light of the functions and
effects of reporting in third sector organizations (including non-profit and co-operative
ones) according to positivist and critical theories of accounting (Palmer andVinten 1998).
Under the positivist theory of accounting reporting, data contained in the report
is able to correctly describe the real organizational performance (Whittington 1986),
while under the critical theory of accounting, even if the real situation is not totally
represented, accounts and reports carry out a fundamental function of internal control
and, from an organizational point-of-view, are powerful operating mechanisms (Chua
1986, Power and Laughlin 1996, Lukes 1974). As such, organizations use reporting
systems to represent rational management performance and, consequently, to improve
levels of process efficiency and effectiveness, as well as overall performance (Nicholls
and Cho 2006). If the tool used does not result in a true and fair view of the situation, it
follows that its use might lead to wrong or counterproductive behaviour.
The above premises indicate that evaluation of the efficiency of BCC and CBs
should be based on integrative techniques of traditional accounting and reporting indi-
cators, using the two accounting approaches previously mentioned (Nicholls 2009). In
fact, the characteristics of the customers and the peculiarities of the relationship be-
tween customers and local CBs point out a different nature of these intermediaries with
respect to the overall financial system (Gutie´rrez 2008).
More comprehensive indicators of efficiency that focus more strongly on quan-
tification of mutual and territorial impact are held to be coherent with both positivist
and critical approaches. This thesis is confirmed by the lack of traditional financial in-
dicators in measuring the effective results obtained by mutual entities to the benefit
of their main stakeholders. Although working from a theoretically positivist viewpoint
(the possibility of measuring generated impact), these models tend to concentrate on
integrating traditional financial indicators in order to strengthen the strategic and or-
ganizational control levers that can be activated to improve effectiveness and efficiency
(critical theory).
Furthermore, a specific characteristic of CBs – and particularly of BCC – is their
commitment to the benefit of local communities (EACB 2010b, 2010c). CBs emphasize
the common good of society and foster self-help, responsibility, and solidarity. They
were historically founded to improve access to finance for their members who would
have had otherwise limited access to finance at reasonable conditions. As a result of
this philosophy, CBs participate in a range of schemes, such as microfinance and finan-
cial education of groups such as the long-time unemployed. They also have a tradition
of fostering the development of their local communities through cultural sponsorship
initiatives, responsible citizenship, and foundation activities. CBs are also among the
market leaders for socially and environmentally responsible investment products, such
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as funds and savings accounts. Green finance is increasingly gaining importance, as a
variety of investment solutions allow the customers of co-operative banks to contribute
to the preservation of the environment.
We believe it is possible to take into account the BCC orientation within the
local community in order to verify whether BCC are less or more competitive compared
to non-co-operative ones, using the two previously mentioned indicators (the financial
value added and the CIR). Thanks to these integrations, in a positivist approach to
accounting and reporting practices, BCC performance appears closer to the reality, that
is efficient and mission-oriented, significantly reducing the gap with non-co-operative
credit institutions.
These integrations are even more necessary if we consider that there is empirical
evidence (Battistin et al. 2012) that territorial connections between managers and local
banks negatively affect the performance of the latter, especially mutual, co-operative,
and rural banks. According to Battistin et al. (2012), territorial connections have a neg-
ative impact on performance in two ways: through inferior skills, since the person owes
his/her position also to the fact that he/she is local; and by protecting the managers after
poor performance, thus offering connected managers the perks of longer tenure, lower
turnover, and higher survival probability, all of which can potentially hurt future bank
performance. Nevertheless, we believe that the performance measurement practices are
affected by non-consideration of CBs’ mutual commitments. For this reason we decided
to adapt the already mentioned indices by taking into account and incorporating in the
process of their determination and calculation the statutory duties of the Italian BCC
in favor of their member-customers and their local community with particular reference
to the constraint of mutuality.
3 Methodology
The study was based on the following two assumptions.
1. When banks pursue mutual goals, they will appear less efficient than the non-co-
operative institutions due to their commitment in favour of members and local
communities.
2. The usual system used by banks and financial institutions to evaluate the effi-
ciency of credit institutions does not take into the account themutual commitment
of CBs, since they are compared with traditional banks for the main efficiency in-
dicators.
We believe, according to the literature on the third sector, thatmutual commitment
is a social and economic value that should be safeguarded and enhanced by financial
authorities and public actors.
In order to answer the exploratory research question as to whether a simplistic and
insufficiently reasoned application of efficiency indicators – such as value added and CIR
– leads to unsatisfactory valuation of banks’ performance (Favero and Papi 1995), we
conducted an empirical analysis on a judgmental sample of BCC that were particularly
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committed, because of an explicit statutory commitment, towards their members and
the local community.
We estimated the change in:
- the levels of value added created and distributed to the main stakeholders by the
entire regional system (33BCCs);
- the CIR of the single CBsmaking some corrections to these indicators according to
the Italian Federation of BCC (Federcasse) sustainability reporting criteria and
guidelines; this was accomplishe by using a sample of 24 BCCs (out of 33).
We strongly believe that efficiency levels of CBs are too often evaluated, both at
national and international levels, without considering their mutual nature. Further-
more, the socio-economic impact of CBs can be judged only by measuring the results
obtained against the situation that would have occurred if bank services and activities
had not been provided.
In this study we utilize data collection methods with particular reference to
archival analysis (33 BCC financial statements analyzed), direct contacts with 33 BCC,
and participant observations with Federcasse delegates. According to Eisenhardt (1989),
our multiple ‘case studies’ approach incorporates both quantitative and qualitative data
and begins as close as possible to the ideal of no preconceived theories to be tested.
However, we determined the research question and some variables prior to commencing
the research (Siggelkow 2007).
We decided upon multiple data collection methods according to the next step of
Eisenhardt’s process (1989), with particular reference to archival analysis (financial
statements), interviews, and participant observations. Multiple methods, in fact, facili-
tate triangulation of the data and therefore contribute to strengthened hypotheses and
constructs (Yin 2009).
Upon completion of data collection, data analysis began at within-case analysis
level so that the research team was able to gain a deep familiarity with each case
(Eisenhardt 1989, Yin 2009).
In this sense, the contribution provided by our study with respect to the existing
literature is manifold.
First, it is one of the few studies dealing with the connection between efficiency
and accounting and reporting practices in CBs. More specifically, we aim at verifying
whether CBs are less or more competitive compared to non-co-operative ones, by us-
ing two indicators: financial value added and CIR. We believe there is a lack in the
literature on this subject, while also noting that the number of studies in the field of
efficiency measurement in CBs is still small (e.g. Worthington 1998, Frame and Coelli
2001, Williams and Gardener 2003, Glass and McKillop 2006, Battaglia et al. 2010).
Furthermore, studies dealing with CBs’ efficiency usually estimate a common frontier
without accounting for country regional differences (e.g. Altunbas et al. 2001, 2003,
Hasan and Lozano-Vivas 2002, Maudos et al. 2002, Girardone et al. 2004, 2009, Weill
2004).
Second, our study focuses on a specific region of Italy (a very useful laboratory
setting for analyzing the impact of mutual and territorial commitment by BCC) and
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considers a wide-ranging set of context variables (e.g. financial returns to member-
customers, donations to the local community, financial support to the local economy,
and the mutual and co-operative regional and national system in intergenerational
perspective). The research also takes into account the performance gap with non-co-
operative credit institutions and attempts to estimate its real consistency in light of
the particular mission of BCC. The data of our sample are compared with those of the
Tuscan Federation of BCC and of the entire Italian banking sector. This was done for
two reasons: Tuscan banking variables fundamentally correspond to national variables,
according to both the Italian central bank (Banca d’Italia) and the Tuscan Regional
Institute for Economic Planning (IRPET). Furthermore, there is no significant presence
of autonomous local (regional) banks that are different from BCC (IRPET 2008, 2011).
Regional banks are nowadays part of national and international banking groups.
Third, we demonstrate that simplistic and insufficiently reasoned application of
efficiency indicators in the co-operative sector – such as value added and CIR – leads to
unsatisfactory valuation of banks’ performance (Favero and Papi 1995).
The study was conducted using the BCC financial statements available in the
Tuscan Federation (FTBCC) database. We also asked individual banks for more de-
tailed information about specific cost and income data related to members and local
communities. In particular, we collected the consolidated statements for 2009 and 2010
of all 33 banks of the Tuscan Federation, and received more detailed information related
to the calculation of cost/income ratio and cooperative costs from 24 banks for the same
years.
2009 and 2010 constitute the last period not influenced by the Italian national
debt crisis, including the fluctuation of interest on government bonds (securities), which
had a great impact on the banks’ financial statements. Furthermore, in these years
Italian banks had been less influenced by the global financial market crisis, due to
different asset allocation against other European competitors. According to the Italian
Banking Association (Associazione Bancaria Italiana-ABI, 2009a, 2009b, 2010) in 2008
financial assets in the Italian banking system represented 18% of total assets against
47% of the European average. This percentage grew to 19.5% in 2009 in comparison
to 39.5% of the European average. Given the parameters of the sample, the analysis
was carried out adopting two financial indicators: value added and CIR. On the values
of global amended CIR we performed some statistical analysis (t test, correlations and
regressions) in order to understand the real impact of the amendments. The same process
has not been possible for the value added since the Tuscan federation of BCC calculates
only the aggregate data at the regional level; the data on individual BCCs is simply not
available.
4 The value added statement
The value added statement uses information from financial accounts to calculate
the value added by an organization through transformation of externally purchased
goods and services (Burchell et al. 1985). It looks beyond income to encompass ownership
and includes the wealth created for a wider group of stakeholders (Mook et al. 2003) by
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transforming the traditional income equation:
Revenues − Expenses = Income
into the following:
Revenues − External Expenses = Income + Internal Expenses = Value Added
The point here is how to split total expenses into internal and external ones,
and there are several possible approaches (Bagnoli and Megali 2011), also considering
international co-operative principles (International Co-operative Alliance 1995).
Applying the value added statement to BCC, the records required and tracked
in the income statement have been reclassified introducing the traditional social key
reading focused on economic and social value added. Furthermore, we calculated the
advantage for member-customers, including the economic advantages obtained through
lower interest expenses.
In order to describe and quantify the latter kind of benefit, we compared the
different BCC customer interest rates between members and non-members. Then we
applied the difference due to the non-members higher interest income rate to themember
loans and the difference due to the lower non-members interest expenses to the member
deposits. We then calculated the members’ advantage, which is usually not disclosed in
ordinary financial statements.
Table 1 expounds the consolidated financial statements of the 33 Tuscan BCC from
a value added point of view for the years 2009 and 2010. Data had been consolidated by
the Tuscan Federation in order to eliminate the operations between the BCC and are
not therefore available on a single-bank basis.
Table 1 – Quantification of the value added 2009–10 in the 33 Tuscan BCC
2010 2009
Total revenues 588,862,645 687,435,519
External costs −368,987,001 −450,733,166
Member-customer advantage 306,277,000 153,773,000
Value added 526,152,644 390,475,353
The member economic advantage has been added, in order to quantify the actual
value added by a co-operative organization.
The value added has been distributed as follows:
Table 2 – Distribution of the valued added 2009–10 in the 33 Tuscan BCC
2010 2009
Amortization 16,755,505 16,530,925
Staff 171,946,711 164,827,668
Member-customer advantage 306,277,000 153,773,000
Taxation 14,788,279 17,368,606
Profit 16,385,149 37,975,154
Value distributed 526,152,644 390,475,353
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The BCC affiliated with the Tuscan Federation obtained a value added of more
than 390 millions of euro in 2009 and more than 526 millions in 2010. Profit has been
paid out and or retained as follows:
Table 3 – 2009–10 profit allocation in the 33 Tuscan BCC
Profit allocation 2010 2009
Legal reserve (retained earnings) 19,895,798 41,619,528
Co-operative funds 861,930 1,515,350
Dividend payout 1,867,639 2,301,887
Stock revaluation (free) 108,349 231,196
Charity and mutuality 2,428,857 4,743,482
Profits distributed in proportion to members transactions 235,000 100,000
Losses −9,012,424 −12,536,289
16,385,149 37.975.154
Value added has been distributed to stakeholders as it follows:
- the strengthening of the single bank system (amortization and retained earnings);
- the members (dividends, stock revaluation, sums distributed in proportion to
members transactions with the bank, and member-customer advantage);
- the staff;
- the community (taxation and charity);
- the co-operative system itself (3% of the yearly profit to co-operative funds).
Table 4 – Distribution to main stakeholders of the valued added 2009–10 in the 33 Tuscan
BCC
Value distributed (with split profit) 2010 2009
System strengthening (amortizations, retained earning, net of losses) 27,638,879 45,614,164
Members 308,487,988 156,406,083
Staff 171,946,711 164,827,668
Community 17,217,136 22,112,088
Co-operative system 861,930 1,515,350
526,152,644 390,475,353
5 The amended cost-income ratio
The CIR – operating costs divided by operating income – is a key bank effi-
ciency measure which is useful to evaluate how costs are changing compared to income
(Burger and Moormann 2008). When related to CBs this indicator shows some lim-
itations with regard to its capacity to measure real performances. These banks are
characterized by a strong originality, looking at the democratic principle (one per-
son one vote), mutuality, and presence in local territories and remote areas (Eacb
2010c). These characteristics call for amending the traditional CIR by recording the
higher operating expenses and the decline in revenues achieved while pursuing their
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mission. To reach a reasonable degree of objectivity only the expenses have been ana-
lyzed, mostly because hypothetic higher revenues are particularly difficult to estimate.
In particular, the adjustments discussed above concentrate on two areas: Members and
Communities.
a) members
We calculated the difference between the CIR and its value if there were no mem-
bers.
Considering the operating costs (OP), we decided to amend:
- costs sustained for non-banking members services (NBS)
- costs sustained for member information, participation, and co-operative identity
(IPC)
- staff cost for member initiatives (SC)
In formulae:
MEMBER CIR (MCIR) = (OP − NBS − IPC − SC)/OPERATING INCOME
b) Communities
We calculated the difference between the CIR and its value if there were no com-
munity commitment.
Considering the operating costs (OP), we decided to amend costs sustained for
sponsorship (SP), territory (T) and the dedicated staff (SC).
In formulae:
COMMUNITY CIR (CCIR) = (OP − SP − T − SC)/OPERATINGINCOME
Moreover, we decided to calculate a global amended CIR (GACIR), that is a ratio
which includes both the member and the community adjustments.
In formulae:
GLOBAL AMENDED CIR (GACIR)
= (OP − NBS − IPC − SP − T − SC)/OPERATING INCOME
Tables 5 and 6 show CIR, MCIR and CCIR and GACIR of the 24 (out of 33) Tuscan
BCC who decided to collaborate to the research project.
The BCC’s common CIR – looking at the single banks, the Tuscan region
(FTBCC), or national (Federcasse) consolidated statements – has worse ratios than the
global Italian banking system. This is due not only to bank inefficiencies – small size,
co-operative governance – but also, and sometimes mainly, to mission related expenses
which traditional banks do not support. Pointing out the amended CIR chart, perfor-
mance of the BCCs, as single banks and in the Tuscan region (considering the 24 BCC
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Table 5 – CIR, MCIR, CCIR and GACIR of the 24 (year 2010) (out of 33) Tuscan BCC
BCC - year 2010 CIR MCIR CCIR GACIR Difference
Anghiari e Stia 66.45% 64.97% 63.97% 62.53% 3.92%
Area Pratese 79.73% 78.27% 77.50% 76.06% 3.67%
Chianti Fiorentino 78.33% 75.05% 68.97% 65.91% 12.42%
Costa d’Argento Capalbio 67.55% 61.19% 64.28% 58.07% 9.48%
Cras - Chianciano Terne Sovic. - Costa Etrusca 83.32% 81.13% 81.43% 79.24% 4.07%
Impruneta 80.85% 80.45% 78.86% 78.47% 2.39%
Maremma 81.56% 77.00% 75.22% 70.77% 10.79%
Masiano 64.77% 59.89% 62.48% 57.69% 7.08%
Montagna Pistoiese 91.35% 88.42% 90.49% 87.58% 3.77%
Montepulciano 73.17% 71.26% 71.09% 69.22% 3.94%
Mugello 63.56% 62.26% 61.45% 60.18% 3.38%
Pescia 75.33% 72.64% 72.69% 70.04% 5.29%
Pistoia 76.09% 74.85% 75.38% 74.15% 1.94%
Pitigliano 80.02% 78.63% 78.46% 77.08% 2.94%
Pontassieve 74.31% 73.33% 71.38% 70.40% 3.91%
Saturnia 78.87% 72.79% 78.35% 72.30% 6.57%
Signa 83.77% 78.64% 82.68% 77.58% 6.19%
Valdarno 83.47% 76.38% 82.15% 75.16% 8.31%
Valdarno Fiorentino Banca di Cascia 76.96% 74.33% 73.05% 70.48% 6.47%
Valdichiana 70.21% 66.23% 67.42% 63.44% 6.77%
Valdinievole 71.14% 68.50% 70.14% 67.52% 3.62%
Versilia - Lunigiana - Garfagnana 87.47% 86.93% 84.71% 84.18% 3.28%
Vibanca 78.03% 73.57% 76.60% 72.19% 5.84%
Vignole 71.02% 67.86% 69.93% 66.80% 4.22%
2010 CIR MCIR∗ CCIR∗ GACIR∗ Difference∗
FTBCC - consolidated statement 76.39% 73.77% 73.78% 71.20% 5.20%
Federcasse 74.20%
Italian banking system 64.90%
∗Considering only the consolidated statements of the analyzed BCC.
consolidated amended results) improves, getting close to the average Italian banking
system CIR.
Furthermore, the GACIR in the Tuscan region is getting worse because of increas-
ing expenses for members (from 5.436 million euro in 2009 to 5.824 million euro in 2010)
and communities (from 7.337 million euro in 2009 to 9.880 million euro in 2010).
At least, we compared the obtained GACIR and Italian banking system CIR be-
cause data on regional CIR are impossible to calculate (since the other banks which
operate in Tuscany are not local banks). See Tables 7 and 8.
A paired t test was performed to investigate if the difference between the means
level CIR and GACIR in 2010 and 2009 was statistically significant for p <.05. Tables
9 and 10 show that the mean of CIR in 2009 and 2010 was significantly higher than
the mean of GACIR. In this sense, we can affirm that the amendments we made are
significant with reference to our BCC sample. See Tables 9 and 10.
Correlations and regression analysis were also performed. Pearson r correlations
were conducted in order to investigate the association between traditional CIR and the
difference between GACIR and traditional CIR for the years considered. This kind of
analysis can help us understand possible correlations between the original levels of
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Table 6 – CIR, MCIR, CCIR and GACIR of the 20 (year 2009) (out of 33) Tuscan BCC
BCC - year 2009 CIR MCIR CCIR GACIR Difference
Anghiari e Stia 61.59% 60.84% 59.79% 59.04% 2.55%
Area Pratese 55.46% 54.64% 53.86% 53.04% 2.42%
Chianti Fiorentino 63.30% 58.69% 57.72% 53.29% 10.00%
Costa d’Argento Capalbio 68.56% 62.47% 65.11% 59.16% 9.39%
Cras - Chianciano Terne Sovic. - Costa Etrusca 74.02% 71.75% 72.36% 70.09% 3.93%
Impruneta 67.57% 67.40% 65.78% 65.60% 1.97%
Maremma 62.96% 59.87% 58.79% 55.74% 7.22%
Masiano 55.68% 51.48% 53.64% 49.54% 6.13%
Montagna Pistoiese 89.85% 86.75% 88.78% 85.69% 4.16%
Montepulciano 70.51% 68.56% 68.15% 66.22% 4.29%
Mugello 63.48% 63.12% 61.87% 61.51% 1.97%
Pescia 69.64% 68.71% 68.02% 67.08% 2.55%
Pistoia 77.20% 59.76% 77.01% 59.61% 17.59%
Pitigliano 77.34% 75.88% 75.18% 73.73% 3.60%
Pontassieve 74.04% 72.95% 70.59% 69.49% 4.55%
Saturnia 73.85% 67.24% 72.50% 65.95% 7.91%
Signa 82.32% 79.84% 81.50% 79.02% 3.30%
Valdarno 68.62% 63.66% 67.43% 62.54% 6.08%
Valdarno Fiorentino Banca di Cascia 61.53% 59.19% 58.48% 56.19% 5.34%
Valdichiana 63.27% 60.39% 60.05% 57.17% 6.10%
Valdinievole 63.54% 62.75% 63.54% 62.75% 0.79%
Versilia - Lunigiana - Garfagnana 80.31% 79.72% 76.98% 76.40% 3.91%
Vibanca 72.57% 69.18% 71.22% 67.88% 4.70%
Vignole 70.42% 66.74% 69.25% 65.61% 4.81%
2009 CIR MCIR∗ CCIR∗ GACIR∗ Difference∗
FTBCC - consolidated statement 69.50% 66.82% 67.79% 65.15% 4.35%
Federcasse 70.20%
Italian banking system 63.10%
∗Considering only the consolidated statements of the analyzed BCC.
BCC efficiency and the effects of the proposed amendments on the concept of efficiency.
Pearson r correlation was not statistically significant (r = −.027, p = .900) for 2009 or
2010 (r = .101, p = .638).
This means that initial levels of efficiency (higher the initial CIR, higher the
inefficiency of BCC) do not affect the levels of costs sustained, on a voluntary basis, for
members and the community. This phenomenon probably happens because the support
of this type of costs depends on management decisions – linked with both the community
needs and the financial situation of the cooperative – in the two years considered in our
analysis.
Pearson r correlation was also used to assess the association between the MC/OC
and CC/OC and the GACIR for the years considered. Results are shown in Table 11.
For 2010 the correlations were not statistically significant. For 2009 the associa-
tion between CC/OC and MC/OC was positive and statistically significant: higher the
MC/OC higher the CC/OC. As expected, both the correlation between CC/OC and GACIR
and between MC/OC and GACIR were negative, but the former was statistically signifi-
cant (higher the CC/OC lower the GACIR), while the latter was not. However, it should
be noted that the significance of the Pearson statistics is influenced by the sample size.
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Table 7 – MC/OC and CC/OC against GACIR of the 24 (year 2010) (out of 33) Tuscan BCC
2010 MC/OC CC/OC GACIR
Anghiari e Stia 1.1% 3.2% 62.5%
Area Pratese 1.7% 2.5% 76.1%
Chianti Fiorentino 1.9% 11.7% 65.9%
Costa d’Argento Capalbio 5.2% 4.8% 58.1%
Cras - Chianciano Terne Sovic. - Costa Etrusca 2.6% 2.3% 79.2%
Impruneta 0.5% 2.5% 78.5%
Maremma 4.8% 6.4% 70.8%
Masiano 3.9% 3.5% 57.7%
Montagna Pistoiese 1.7% 0.9% 87.6%
Montepulciano 0.6% 2.8% 69.2%
Mugello 0.5% 3.3% 60.2%
Pescia 1.9% 3.5% 70.0%
Pistoia 0.5% 0.9% 74.2%
Pitigliano 1.7% 1.9% 77.1%
Pontassieve 1.3% 3.9% 70.4%
Saturnia 1.8% 0.7% 72.3%
Signa 4.0% 1.3% 77.6%
Valdarno 0.7% 1.6% 75.2%
Valdarno Fiorentino Banca di Cascia 2.0% 5.1% 70.5%
Valdichiana 5.7% 4.0% 63.4%
Valdinievole 1.7% 1.4% 67.5%
Versilia - Lunigiana - Garfagnana 0.6% 3.1% 84.2%
Vibanca 4.5% 0.9% 72.2%
Vignole 2.6% 1.5% 66.8%
0.0%
FTBCC 1.95% 3.30% 71.20%
Even if it was not statistically significant, the negative correlations can be considered
moderate and interpretable.
After these preliminary analyses, we conducted two linear multiple regressions
using the GACIR as dependent variable. In the first regression, MC/OC and CC/OC
for 2010 were simultaneously entered into the equation (Table 12). The model as a
whole explained the 22.5% of the variance of GACIR. The amount of variance was not
statistically significant. However, the low dimension of the sample might have affect the
significance of the results.
In the second regression,MC/OC andCC/OC for 2009were simultaneously entered
in the equation. The model as a whole explained the 20.1% of the variance of global
amended CIR. The amount of variance was not statistically significant. However, the
CC/OC was found to be a significant predictor of GACIR (Table 13).
In conclusion, GACIR seems to be at least in part explained byMC/OC and CC/OC.
Specifically, CC/OC plays a major role in explaining the variance. The association was
negative for both 2009 and 2010. Hence, a higher propensity to sustain costs for the
community is associated with significant lower levels of GACIR. These findings need
to be replicated with a bigger sample. Indeed, the non significant predictive power of
MC/OC might be associated with the sample size.
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Table 8 – MC/OC and CC/OC against GACIR of the 24 (year 2009) (out of 33) Tuscan BCC
2009 MC/OP CC/OP GACIR
Anghiari e Stia 1.2% 2.9% 59.0%
Area Pratese 1.3% 2.8% 53.0%
Chianti Fiorentino 4.3% 8.6% 53.3%
Costa d’Argento Capalbio 5.3% 5.0% 59.2%
Cras - Chianciano Terne Sovic. - Costa Etrusca 3.1% 2.2% 70.1%
Impruneta 0.3% 2.7% 65.6%
Maremma 3.8% 6.6% 55.7%
Masiano 2.7% 3.7% 49.5%
Montagna Pistoiese 2.4% 1.2% 85.7%
Montepulciano 2.3% 3.3% 66.2%
Mugello 0.6% 2.5% 61.5%
Pescia 1.3% 2.3% 67.1%
Pistoia 1.5% 0.2% 59.6%
Pitigliano 1.8% 2.6% 73.7%
Pontassieve 1.5% 4.7% 69.5%
Saturnia 4.9% 1.8% 65.9%
Signa 2.9% 1.0% 79.0%
Valdarno 0.5% 1.7% 62.5%
Valdarno Fiorentino Banca di Cascia 2.6% 4.9% 56.2%
Valdichiana 4.6% 5.1% 57.2%
Valdinievole 0.0% 0.0% 62.8%
Versilia - Lunigiana - Garfagnana 0.7% 4.1% 76.4%
Vibanca 3.7% 1.0% 67.9%
Vignole 3.0% 1.7% 65.6%
0.0%
FTBCC 1.79% 2.41% 65.15%
Table 9 – Comparison between CIR and GACIR means (2010): paired t test
Mean Quantity Standard deviation t (23) p
CIR 76.56 24 7.13 9.910 .000
GACIR 71.13 24 7.69
Table 10 – Comparison between CIR and GACIR means (2009): paired t test
Mean Quantity Standard deviation t (23) p
CIR 69.48 24 8.34 7.30 .000
GACIR 64.26 24 8.71
Table 11 – Pearson r correlations between MC/OC, CC/OC and GACIR
MC/OC CC/OC GACIR
MC/OC 1 .176 − .344
CC/OC .425∗ 1 − .382
GACIR − .165 − .455∗ 1
∗p <. 05.
Note:Correlations for 2010 are reported above the diagonal. Correlations for 2009 are reported under the diagonal.
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Table 12 – Multiple linear regression: criterion variable GACIR (2010)
B SE β t p
(Constant) 77.507 2.974 26.060 .000
MC/OC −1.368 .936 − .285 −1.461 .159
CC/OC −1.083 .638 − .332 −1.698 .104
Note: R2 = .225, R2 = .151, p = .069.
Table 13 – Multiple linear regression: criterion variable GACIR (2009)
B SE β t p
(Constant) 69.867 3.452 20.240 .000
MC/OC .200 1.224 .035 .163 .872
CC/OC −2.009 .917 − .470 −2.191 .040
Note: R2 = .208, R2 = .133 , p = .086.
6 Conclusions
The aim of the present study was to verify whether CBs are more or less com-
petitive when compared to non-co-operatives banks by using and adapting two main
financial indicators: the financial value added and the CIR. In the light of the results
above, we can affirm that BCCs undoubtedly have lower levels of efficiency compared
with traditional banks. However, this gap is much reduced if we modify the calculation
of indicators to take into account the mutual aims of CBs.
Our analysis demonstrates that value added, for co-operative banks, must neces-
sarily be reconsidered from a social point-of-view in order to take into account mutual
aims. We wanted to add to the financial results the value of the member-customer in
order to better define the amount of wealth that was effectively distributed to the var-
ious beneficiaries. For this reason, the higher income (from investments and deposits)
or the lower costs (for loans) of the member-customer, with respect to the non-member
customer, have been counted as internal, not external costs.
Our research showed that 153.7million euro in 2009 and no less than 306.2million
euro in 2010 were invested by BCC in Tuscany in favour of their member-customers.
This information, had the accounting parameter of value added not been reconsidered,
would not have emerged from a normal banking sector financial analysis.
With respect to total income of the BCC analyzed (687million euro in 2009 and 589
million euro in 2010), 390 million in 2009 (57%) and 526 million in 2010 (89%) represent
the value distributed to the co-operative system in a wider sense. That is to say, this
included BCC self-financing, payouts to members, staff and collaborators, philanthropic
contributions to local communities and re-investment of resources to strengthen the
co-operative system in favour of future generations.
As far as the CIR is concerned, our reconsideration of accounts brought to light
even more interesting data. The median values of the spread between CIR and global-
amended CIR in 2010, for the 24 BCC considered, was 5.5 percentage points for 2010
and 4.4 percentage points for 2009. Even more indicative are arithmetic means of the
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global-amended CIR of the Tuscan BCC – 64.9% in 2010 and 62.9% in 2009. These
are very close to those of the entire Italian banking sector (67.9% in 2010 and 63.10%
in 2009), with near-negligible differences of 3 percentage points in 2010 and only 0.2
percentage points in 2009.
In this sense, results show that our re-elaboration of the value added and CIR
indicators brings the BCC closer to the national banking average. It should also be
remembered that, as previously explained, it was not possible to rectify values of rev-
enues within the CIR indicator. Had this been done, it is highly likely that the dif-
ferences between BCC and the Italian banking sector overall would have effectively
vanished.
It is important, therefore, to measure performance using instruments that are
coherent with the mutualist nature of the BCC, adapting the normal banking fi-
nancial analysis instruments to this case. The corrections made to traditional value
added and CIR indicators allowed us to better appreciate the reality of co-operative
credit, which appears more efficient and more mission-oriented than in the litera-
ture thus far, significantly reducing the performance gap with non-co-operatives credit
institutions.
In actual fact, the presumed inefficiency of CBs derives in part from their need
to maintain their mutual and social mission. This has interesting repercussions on ac-
counting disciplines, since it questions the need to adapt financial analysis instruments
to the special mission of CBs. In this context, some possible developments of the present
study would be extension of the sample analyzed in order to generalize the results of
this preliminary investigation and, above all, analysis of the socio-economic impact gen-
erated by the single BCC on their territories, in order to measure results effectively
obtained with respect to the initial situation.
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